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Abstract
Individuals prefer to coordinate with others, but they differ on the preferred action.
In theory, this can give rise to an integrated society with everyone conforming to the
same action or a segregated society with members of different groups choosing diverse
actions. Social welfare is maximum when society is integrated and everyone conforms
on the majority’s action. In laboratory experiments, subjects with different preferences
segregate into distinct groups and choose diverse actions. To understand the role of
partner choice, we then consider an exogenous network of partners. Subjects in the
experiment now choose to conform on the action preferred by the majority. Thus,
there exists a tension between two deeply held values: social cohesion and freedom of
association.
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1 Introduction
We study the relation between two deeply held values: social cohesion and freedom of asso-
ciation. Social cohesion calls for wide interpersonal interaction and is supported by shared
norms of behavior. The interest in social cohesion is not limited to academic discourse:
threats to shared norms and values are a prominent topic of discussion in contemporary
American and European politics. Differences in preferences across modes of behavior is
a recurring theme in these debates.1 Freedom of association includes the right to form
relationships to join or leave groups of a person’s own choosing.2 This paper examines the
role of freedom of association in sustaining shared norms of behavior, when individuals
have differing views on preferred norms.
To clarify the key considerations and in order to be able to discuss social welfare, we
start by setting out a theoretical model. There is a group of individuals who each choose
between two actions a and b. Everyone prefers to coordinate on one action but individuals
differ in the action they prefer: group A prefers action a, group B prefers action b. We
consider a baseline setting in which everyone is obliged to interact with everyone else. And a
setting that reflects freedom of association: individuals decide with whom they interact. In
the latter setting, everyone observes the network that is created and then chooses between
action a and b. The theoretical analysis reveals a rich set of possibilities.
Consider first the case where everyone interacts with everyone else. There exist three
equilibria: everyone conforming to action a, everyone conforming to action b, and diversity
(with group A members choosing a and group B choosing b). The diversity outcome is
sustainable only when neither of the groups is too small. Aggregate welfare is defined as
the sum of individual payoffs. We show that conforming to the majority action maximizes
social welfare.
Consider next the setting with freedom of association. Again, there exist multiple
possible stable outcomes: broadly, they take on two forms. In one case, everyone con-
nects with everyone else and chooses the same action. We refer to this as integration with
conformism. The other case exhibits separation of the community into two distinct compo-
1For example, in January 2017, the Dutch Prime Minister brought out a Public Advertisement in which
he urged individuals belonging to minority communities to ‘be normal’ or ’to leave the country’. A key
aspect of the Dutch context is that individuals differ in their preferences over norms. In the Dutch context,
a prominent case pertains to a male applicant for the job of a driver at a coach company who did not want
to shake hands with female passengers. The company refused to hire him.
2It is guaranteed by the United States Bill of Rights, the European Convention on Human Rights, and
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
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nents: everyone within a component chooses the same action. Integration and conforming
on the majority action is welfare maximizing.
Thus, the theory yields a clear cut prediction on welfare: in both the exogenous and
endogenous interaction setting, conforming to the majority action maximizes aggregate
welfare. However, a variety of other – inefficient – outcomes are possible under both the
exogenous and the endogenous linking setting. So, to get a better sense of the role of
freedom of association, we turn to laboratory experiments.
The experiments involve groups of 15 subjects, who play a coordination game repeatedly
over 20 rounds. There is a majority sub-group with 8 subjects and a minority sub-group
with 7 subjects. The principal finding is that, with exogenous interaction, conformity on
the majority obtains; by contrast, in the endogenous interaction setting there is almost
complete segregation (between the majority and minority) and a diversity of actions. So
our experiment suggests that when individuals differ on preferred modes of behavior, there
exists a tension between the principle of freedom of association, on the one hand, and social
cohesion and welfare, on the other hand. This tension creates large welfare losses. Figures
7 and 8 illustrate the dynamics leading to these outcomes.
A closer examination of the dynamics of the linking and action choice in the experiment
reveals that in the exogenous network setting, in round 1, around 40% of minority conforms
to the majority action. Gradually, over time this fraction grows and there is close to full
conformity by round 15. By contrast, in the endogenous linking treatments, in round 1,
less than 20% of the minority choose the majority action. This suggests that differences
in outcomes at round 1 are sharp and dramatic. Indeed, given these initial conditions,
minority individuals who choose a myopic best response would be led to conformism on
the majority action in the exogenous setting, and will remain segregated and choose their
own preferred action in the endogenous setting.
We then turn to a theoretical explanation for observed behavior. We explore four ap-
proaches: stochastic stability, team reasoning, social preferences, and level-k reasoning.
The predictions of the former two approaches are more clear cut and we summarize them
here: both stochastic stability and team reasoning predict conformism on majority ac-
tion with exogenous networks. The predictions under endogenous linking are more varied:
both integration and segregation are dynamically stable under endogenous linking. Sim-
ilarly, under team reasoning, segregation and diversity are sustainable (along with other
outcomes) under endogenous networks. Thus the experimental finding of conformism on
majority action is strongly consistent with the two theories, while the finding of segregation
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and diversity is only ‘weakly’ consistent with the theory.
Our paper is a contribution to the study of social coordination. Experiments on coor-
dination have been a very active field of research, Charness et al. [2014], Crawford [1995],
Isoni et al. [2014], Kearns et al. [2012]. In this literature, the minimum effort game has been
especially prominent. It offers a simple way for thinking about situations in which every-
one must agree about the outcome and yet there is a range of Pareto ranked (equilibrium)
actions. The theoretical simplicity has motivated a number of experimental investigations
of this game, over the years. The early experiments showed that subjects converged to the
lowest welfare Nash equilibrium, Van Huyck et al. [1990]. A number of variations on the
original experiment with varying outcomes have been reported since then; notable contri-
butions include van Huyk et al. [1991], Crawford [1991], Crawford and Broseta [1998]. Our
paper is closely related to a recent paper by Riedl et al. [2016] who introduce the possibility
that players can choose their partners while playing the minimum effort game. They find
that endogenizing the choice of partners has a dramatic effect on behavior: players now
converge to the most efficient Nash equilibrium.3 A key factor explaining their results is
that players are ostracized (and isolated) if they do not contribute the maximum effort.
However, if they increase their contribution (i.e. behave as expected by the group), then
they are welcomed back in the group. This leads eventually to a completely connected
network contributing the maximum effort level. In the present paper, individuals have
differing preferences across social outcomes. Our experiment reveals that these differences
become salient when linking is endogenous. Thus, our work shows that endogenizing link-
ing can have very different consequences, depending on whether or not individuals have
heterogeneous or similar preferences.
We turn finally to the experiments on identity and coordination games. Types in our
setting may naturally be interpreted as an aspect of identity.4 In particular, following the
3More generally, following on the work of Blume [1993] and Ellison [1993], interest has centered on the
role of interaction structures in shaping coordination. Goyal and Vega-Redondo [2005] and Jackson and
Watts [2002] developed models in which players choose partners and also actions in a coordination game. In
recent work, Advani and Reich [2015], Bojanowski and Buskens [2011] and Ellwardt et al. [2016] introduce
heterogeneous preferences in the framework with partner choice and action choice.
There is also a strand of work on the role of endogenous interactions in cooperation, see e.g., Wang et al.
[2012], Gallo and Yan [2015], Cuesta et al. [2015]. For a study of the effects of endogenous groups in public
goods games, see Kosfeld et al. [2009].
4There is a large literature on identity, spanning across several disciplines in the social sciences and in
philosophy. For an early and influential study in economics of how individual choices may lead to segregation
and the the break down of social cohesion, see Schelling [1978]. In recent years, there has been a great deal
of interest in understanding the ways in which identity shapes behavior in society, organizations, markets,
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work of Sherif et al. [1988], a number of papers have looked at the role of identity in shaping
behavior in an experimental setting. The papers have developed an experimental design
in which identity is ‘minimal’: individuals are made to associate themselves with others
who share a similar view on something orthogonal to the experiment itself. A common
example is shared ideas on a piece of art: so two individuals share the same identity
if they like the same painting and not otherwise. The experiment then shows how this
‘minimal group’ identity can play a large role in shaping behavior in games and decision
problems. A leading paper in this line of work, Chen and Chen [2011] shows that group
identity has direct effects on social preferences, which in turn can induce higher effort in
the minimum effort game. They show that exogenously varying the salience of identity
leads to a significant improvement in efficiency of play in the minimum effort game.
In our setting identities are reflected in payoff differences and they are kept constant.
We interpret our findings as suggesting that freedom of association allows identity more
space to become salient. This is perhaps best revealed in the treatment where the costs
of linking are zero. Now linking with everyone is a ‘weakly dominant’ strategy, and so
subjects should create a complete network. But then we are in the same setting as the
exogenous networks, and so subjects should all conform on the majority action. In the
experiment, subjects create ‘almost’ complete networks but different types nevertheless
choose their preferred actions! This suggests that the very possibility of linking makes
different preferences/identities salient. Figure 14 illustrates the dynamics in the zero cost
setting.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and a theoretical anal-
ysis. Section 3 presents our experimental design, procedure and the experimental findings.
Section 4 takes up theoretical explanations. Section 5 concludes. Appendix A contains
some of the proofs, while Appendix B contains the instructions for the experiments.
2 Theory
We study a network formation and action choice game in which individuals benefit from
selecting the same action as their neighbours. However, individuals differ on their preferred
action. There are thus two types of individuals. We study networks that are stable and
characterise the nature of equilibrium action choices in networks.
and in local government, see e.g., Sethi and Somanathan [2004], Akerlof and Kranton [2000], Alesina et al.
[1999], Advani and Reich [2015], Bisin and Verdier [2000].
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2.1 The model
Let N = {1, 2, . . . , n} with n ≥ 3. The game has two stages. In the first stage, every player
i ∈ N chooses a set of link proposals gi with others, gi = (gi1, . . . , gii−1, gii+1, . . . , gin),
where gij ∈ {0, 1} for any j ∈ N\{i}. Let Gi = {0, 1}n−1 define i’s set of link proposals.
The induced network g = (g1, g2, . . . , gn) is a directed graph. The closure of g is an
undirected network denoted by g where gij = gijgji for every i, j ∈ N . We define the finite
set of all undirected networks g as G. Player i’s strategy in the second stage is defined
through a total function xi mapping every undirected network g that can result from the
first stage to an action in A = {a, b}. Formally, xi : G→ A, and we define Xi as the set of
all such strategies for player i. We denote the set of overall strategies of player i in the full
game as Si = Gi×Xi, and the set of overall strategies for all players as S = S1× . . .×Sn.
A strategy profile s = (x, g) specifies the link proposals made by every player in the first
stage through g = (g1, g2, . . . , gn), and the choice functions made by each player in the
second stage through x = (x1, x2, . . . , xn). We define Ni(g) = {j ∈ N : gij = 1} as the set
of i’s neighbours in the network g.
Moreover, for every player i, let θi ∈ {a, b} define i’s type. This leads us to define
Na = {i ∈ N : θi = a} and Nb = {i ∈ N : θi = b} as the groups of players preferring
action a and b respectively (Na ∪Nb = N). If |Na| 6= |Nb|, we refer to the largest group of
players sharing the same type/preferences as the majority and the other as the minority.
Furthermore, we define
χi(g, x) = {j ∈ Ni(g) : xj = θi} (1)
as the set of i’s neighbours who play i’s preferred action (χi(g) ⊆ Ni(g)). In what
follows, we shall write g− gij (resp. g+ g¯ij) to refer to an undirected network g′ such that
g¯′ij = 0 (resp. g
′
ij = 1) and g
′
kl = g¯kl if k 6∈ {i, j} or l 6∈ {i, j}.
Given strategy profile s, the utility for player i is defined as:
ui(x, g) = λ
θi
xi(1 +
∑
j∈Ni(g)
I{xi=xj})− |Ni(g)|k (2)
where Ixj=xi is the indicator function of i’s neighbour j choosing the same action as player
i. The parameter λ is defined as follows: λθixi = α if xi(g) = θi (i chooses his preferred
action), and λθixi(g) = β if xi(g) 6= θi (i chooses his less preferred action) with β < α. This
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payoff function is taken from Ellwardt et al. [2016].5
To focus on the interesting cases, we will assume a cost of forming a link k < β. Observe
that if β < k, then no player will benefit from playing their less preferred action. Moreover,
if α < k, then no player benefits from forming any link.
2.2 Equilibrium analysis
This section studies equilibrium networks and behavior. We solve backwards, starting with
behavior in a given network. We then move to stage 1 and solve for stable networks.
For ease of exposition, we will drop the argument g and simply refer to strategies by xi.
The following result, taken from Ellwardt et al. [2016], characterises equilibrium behavior
in an arbitrary network.
Proposition 1. Fix a network g. A strategy profile x∗ is a Nash equilibrium if and only
if, for every i ∈ N :
x∗i
= θi if |χi(g)| >
β
α+β |Ni(g)| − α−βα+β
6= θi if |χi(g)| < βα+β |Ni(g)| − α−βα+β
The proof of this result follows from some elementary computations which are presented
in the main text as they provide a good sense of the basic trade-offs involved. Player i’s
payoff from choosing θi is α(|χi(g)| + 1) and from choosing the other action is β(Ni(g) −
|χi(g)|+ 1). So he is strictly better off choosing θi if and only if
α(|χi(g)|+ 1) ≥ β(Ni(g)− |χi(g)|+ 1). (3)
This inequality can be rewritten as
|χi(g)| > β
α+ β
|Ni(g)| − α− β
α+ β
(4)
Intuitively, a player is better off selecting his preferred action if and only if the pro-
portion of his neighbours in g selecting the same action is sufficiently large. To illustrate
the implications of this result we consider a complete network. This network is interesting
as it captures a situation of full integration where every player interacts with every other
player.
5For related work on coordination games with heterogenous preferences in exogenous networks, see
Hernandez et al. [2013] and Neary [2012].
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Proposition 2. Fix a complete network g. Suppose x∗ be a Nash equilibrium. Then
(i) every player selects the same action, i.e., x∗i = x
∗
j ∈ {a, b} for all i, j ∈ N if n ≥ α/β.
(ii) every player selects their preferred action, i.e., x∗i = θi, for all i ∈ N if |Na|, |Nb| ≥
β(n+1)
α+β .
We sketch the proof here. It follows from Proposition 1 that conforming on one action is
an equilibrium if both the majority and minority individuals have no profitable deviation.
The payoff to a majority individual is nα and the payoff to a minority individual is nβ.
Since a deviating minority individual would obtain a payoff of α, it then follows that
conformism is an equilibrium if n ≥ α/β.
Turning to the diversity outcome, note that if some player i benefits by playing xi 6= θi,
then so would every player j of the same type. It then follows from Proposition 1 that
diversity is an equilibrium if:
|Ny| − 1 ≥ β
α+ β
(n− 1)− α− β
α+ β
. (5)
for y ∈ {a, b}. This inequality can be rewritten as
|Ny| ≥ β(n+ 1)
α+ β
(6)
for any y ∈ {a, b}. This completes the argument.
So, we have shown that, in a complete network, there are only three equilibrium out-
comes: conformity where every player coordinates on the same action, a or b, and diversity
where every player chooses their preferred action. Observe that conformity outcomes are
always equilibria, regardless of the fraction of different types. On the other hand, the
existence of the diversity outcome is contingent on a sufficiently large minority.
Figure 1 illustrates these equilibrium outcomes in a society with fifteen individuals.
There are 8 players in circles and the remaining 7 individuals are in “triangles”. The
circles prefer action ‘blue’, while the triangles prefer ‘red’.
Turning to social welfare: we define aggregate welfare as the sum of earnings of all
players. An outcome is said to be socially efficient if it maximizes aggregate welfare.
Proposition 3. In a complete network, conformity on the majority’s preferred action is
socially efficient.
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(a) Conformity (majority) (b) Conformity (minority) (c) Diversity
Figure 1: Nash equilibria in complete network
Proof. Let x and y be the number of players playing b in Na and Nb, respectively. The
sum of individual payoffs is
W (x, y) = (n− x− y)(α(|Na| − x) + β(|Nb| − y)) + (x+ y)(βx+ αy). (7)
For fixed y, social welfare is decreasing in x if x < x∗ and increasing in x for x > x∗,
where
x∗ =
β(|Nb| − 2y) + α(|Na| − 2y) + α(n)
2(α+ β)
. (8)
Similarly, for any x, social welfare is decreasing in y if y < y∗, and increasing in y for
y > y∗, where
y∗ =
α(|Na| − 2x) + β(|Nb| − 2x) + β(n)
2(α+ β)
(9)
Since 0 ≤ x ≤ |Na| and 0 ≤ y ≤ |Nb|, it follows that W (x, y) is maximized for
some x ∈ {0, |Na|} and some y ∈ {0, |Nb|}. Note that W (0, |Nb|) = α(|Na|2 + |Nb|2), and
W (|Na|, 0) = β(|Na|2+|Nb|2), which directly implies that W (0, |Nb|) > W (|Na|, 0) (because
α > β). Furthermore, since W (0, 0) = n(α|Na|+β|Nb|), we have that W (0, 0) > W (0, |Nb|)
if and only if
|Na|
|Nb| >
α− β
α+ β
(10)
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This inequality holds whenever |Na| > |Nb|.
Similarly, sinceW (|Na|, |Nb|) = n(β|Na|+α|Nb|), we have thatW (|Na|, |Nb|) > W (0, |Nb|)
if and only if
|Nb|
|Na| >
α− β
α+ β
(11)
This inequality holds whenever |Nb| > |Na|. Furthermore, note that equations (10) and
(11) hold for |Na| = |Nb| as long as β > 0. To summarize, we always have that either
W (0, 0) > W (0, |Nb|) or W (|Na|, |Nb|) > W (0, |Nb|) as long as |Na| 6= |Nb| or β > 0.
Finally, consider the case where x = |Na| and y = |Nb|: this implies that x+y = n. Since
α > β, it can be shown that W (0, 0) > W (|Na|, |Nb|) so long as |Na| > |Nb|. Moreover,
W (0, 0) < W (|Na|, |Nb|) holds as long as |Na| < |Nb|. Finally, W (0, 0) = W (|Na|, |Nb|) if
|Na| = |Nb|.
The proof says that diversity is never socially desirable. The intuition is fairly simple:
fixing the behavior of one group, it is never desirable for the other group to mix actions.
This follows from the coordination externalities inherent in our model. So we only need to
compare the two outcomes: one, where everyone conforms to action a and the other where
everyone conforms to action b. The final step simply says that conformism on a is better if
and only if the group that prefers a constitutes a majority. So, in our example, the socially
efficient outcome corresponds to Figure 1(a).
We now analyze the link formation process in stage 1. We adapt the pairwise stability
notion from Jackson and Wolinsky [1996] to our setting. So in the spirit of their definition,
we say that a network and corresponding equilibrium action profile is stable if no individual
can profitably deviate either unilaterally or with one other individual. Given a network
action pair (g, x(g)), x−ij(g) refers to the choices of all players, other than players i and j.
Definition 1. A network-action pair (g, x(g)) is pairwise stable if:
• x(g) is an equilibrium action profile given network g.
• for every gij = 1, ui(x, g) ≥ ui(x, g − gij) and uj(x, g) ≥ uj(x, g − gij), where x is
such that x−ij(g − gij) = x−ij(g), and xl ∈ arg maxx′l∈Xl ul(θl, x′l, x−l, g − gij) for
l ∈ {i, j}.
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• for every gij = 0, ui(x, g) ≥ ui(x, g+ gij) or uj(x, g) ≥ uj(x, g+ gij) where x is such
that x−ij(g+gij) = x−ij(g), and xl ∈ arg maxx′l∈Xl ul(θl, x′l, x−l, g+gij) for l ∈ {i, j}.
In this definition, part (2) says that no player can delete an existing link and profit, while
part (3) says that no pair of players can form an additional link and increase their payoffs.
In both cases, note that we only require that the players directly affected by a change of
the link re-optimize actions; all other players remain with their pre-specified equilibrium
action, corresponding to network g. This restriction to very local action adjustments are
in the spirit of pairwise stability, but they do not fully reflect the idea behind sub-game
perfection. Our aim here is to show that conformism and diversity can both be supported
in a pairwise stable outcome; moreover, these outcomes are supported by fairly different
network structures. We believe that this general observation is robust in the sense that it
does not depend on specific details of the definition above.
A useful implication of Definition 1 is that in a pairwise stable network-action pair, any
two players who choose the same action in the second stage must also be linked with each
other. On the other hand, in a pairwise stable network-action pair, any two players who
choose different actions in the second stage are not linked to each other. For any pairwise
stable pair (g, x(g)), xi(g) = xj(g) if and only if gij = 1.
This means that in a pairwise stable network-action pair, there can be at most two
components, each component is complete, and every individual in a component must choose
the same action.
Proposition 4. Suppose (g∗, x∗(g∗)) is pairwise stable. Then
(i) g∗ is a complete network and for all i ∈ N , x∗i (g∗) = m, where m ∈ {a, b}.
(ii) g∗ contains two complete components, Ca and Cb; every player in Ca chooses a, while
every player in Cb chooses b.
This allows us to define two types of outcomes: integration with conformity, where ev-
eryone links with everyone else, and chooses the same action and segregation with diversity,
where individuals constitute two components, each of which chooses a different action.
The proof of the result is immediate, from the observations preceding it. In the in-
tegration with conformity outcome, every player forms links with all others, and they all
coordinate on the same action, regardless of the type. The segregation with diversity out-
comes do not depend on the players’ types whenever the size of the smallest component is
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(a) Integration (majority) (b) Integration (minority)
(c) Segregation by type (d) Mixed segregation
Figure 2: Pairwise stable outcomes
sufficiently large (otherwise, all players of the smallest group have to be of the same type
and playing their preferred action).
It is worth drawing out the content of the result in the context of our example (with
n = 15, |Ncircle| = 8, and |Ntriangle| = 7). The integration with conformism outcomes
and the segregation with diversity outcomes are illustrated in Figure 2. The first part of
the Figure represents the outcomes with integration and conformity and correspond to the
outcomes under complete network. The second part of the Figure illustrates segregation
outcomes.
We next note that with endogenous interaction, social welfare is maximized under
integration and conformism on the majority’s action.
Proposition 5. In the game with linking and action choice, the socially efficient outcome
always entails integration and conformity on the majority’s preferred action.
Proof. It is straightforward to see that in a socially efficient outcome, two players are linked
with each other, if and only if, they choose the same action. This implies that it must be
formed of at most two completely connected components. Let x and y be the number of
players playing b in Na and Nb respectively. We define the sum of individual payoffs in the
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corresponding outcome as
W (x, y) = (n−x−y)((α−k)(|Na|−x)+(β−k)(|Nb|−y))+(x+y)((β−k)x+(α−k)y)+kn
(12)
If we replace α and β with α−k and β−k in the proof of Proposition 3, then the proof
follows.
The integration equilibrium with conformity on the majority’s preferred action is the
unique socially efficient outcome whenever such a majority exists (i.e., |Na| 6= |Nb|). In the
context of our example, the socially efficient outcome corresponds to Figure 2(a).
To summarize: in the exogenous complete network there exist multiple equilibria ex-
hibiting conformity and diversity. The conformity equilibria are independent of group
sizes, while the diversity equilibria can only arise if the minority group is not too small.
Conformity is always welfare maximizing. In the endogenous setting, there exist multiple
equilibria exhibiting integration with conformity and segregation with diversity. Finally,
integration with conformity on the majority’s preferred action maximizes welfare.
So diversity and conformism can arise under both exogenous as well as under endoge-
nous interaction. Conformism on the majority action is always socially optimal. We con-
duct laboratory experiments to understand how freedom of association – interpreted here
as choice of links – determines the level of integration, the extent of behavioral diversity,
and the aggregate social welfare.
3 Experiments
3.1 Experimental design
To evaluate the effects of linking on coordination and on welfare, we study two main
treatments: ENDO and EXO. The treatment ENDO starts with an empty network and
refers to the two stage model of linking and action choice. The treatment EXO specifies
that players are located in an exogenously given complete network and they simply choose
between two coordination actions.
Throughout we consider groups of 15 subjects. Subjects interact repeatedly, within the
same group, for 20 rounds (plus 5 unpaid trial rounds). Prior to the start of play, subjects
were informed of a symbol, either a circle or a triangle, and an identification number,
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Figure 3: Individual Types
from 1 to 15, assigned to them. Every subject knew his symbol, number and the symbol
and number of the 14 others in his group. Both symbol and number were kept fixed for
the entire session. Groups are composed of 8 circles (the majority group) and 7 triangles
(the minority group). Figure 3 presents the screen that subjects saw at the start of the
experiment.
In the treatment ENDO, there were two stages. First subjects simultaneously made
proposals to a subset of the others in their group. Reciprocated proposals led to the
creation of links. If a link was formed then both subjects paid a cost of k = 2 points for
it. Then, in the second stage, subjects were informed of the links proposed and those that
were formed in stage 1. After observing the created network, subjects chose one of two
actions: up or down. Figure 4 illustrates the network date that they observed at this point.
In the screenshot, links that are proposed but not reciprocated are represented as light
‘incomplete’ links, while reciprocated proposals were represented as dark and ‘complete’
links. So in the screenshot, player 7 creates links with 4, 15, 8, 3 and 12. He does not
reciprocate proposals from 9, 10, 14, 1, while he makes unreciprocated proposals to 11 and
2.
The values of the parameters are α = 6, β = 4, and k = 2. For a subject with symbol
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Figure 4: Linking proposals: reciprocated and unreciprocated
circle (triangle), his preferred action is up (down). Finally, every player sees the outcome of
the game on the screen and his net payoffs. This screenshot is illustrated in Figure 5. Here
we see that player 7’s neighborhood includes 4, 15, 8, 3 and 12. He coordinates successfully
on his less preferred action with players 15, 8 and 3, and he fails to coordinate with 4 and
12. Thus his net payoff is 4 × 4 − 5 × 2 = 6. Finally, at the beginning of any round r>1,
in stage 1, information about everyone’s behavior in both stages of the previous round is
provided to every subject, as shown through Figure 6.
In the treatment EXO, all subjects interacted with every other group member in a
complete network. The subjects were shown the complete network and they had to choose
between actions up and down.6 Given that there is no linking decision, there are also no
linking costs. For this reason, and to make earnings comparable between treatments, the
parameters in EXO are: α = 4, β = 2.7 The Instructions handed out to subjects are
presented in Appendix B.
6The complete network was however shown as it would be in ENDO, had the complete network emerged,
see the instructions in the Appendix
7Being connected with a player who plays one’s most preferred action is worth α = 4 in EXO and
α − k = 4 in ENDO. Similarly, for the payoffs from the less preferred action, the payoff is 2 in both
treatments.
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Figure 5: Neighborhood, Actions and Payoffs
Figure 6: Feedback from previous round
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To test the robustness of our main findings, we will consider variations on the two main
treatments. These variations will entail different costs of linking and different relative sizes
of the majority and minority groups. The following table provides a summary of all our
treatments.
Network (N = 15)
Endogenous Exogenous
Distribution
(start from empty net) (complete net)
k = 2 k = 0.5 k = 0 -
α = 6 α = 4.5 α = 4 α = 4
β = 4 β = 2.5 β = 2 β = 2
|NO| = 8 ENDO CHEAP FREE EXO
|N∆| = 7 (6 groups) (6 groups) (6 groups) (6 groups)
|NO| = 12 LOWCONFLICT
|N∆| = 3 (6 groups)
Table 1: Experimental Treatments
3.2 Experimental procedure
The experiment was conducted in the Laboratory for Research in Experimental and Be-
havioural Economics (LINEEX) at the University of Valencia. Subjects interacted through
computer terminals and the experiment was programmed using z-Tree [Fischbacher, 2007].
Upon arrival, subjects were randomly seated in the laboratory. At the beginning of the ex-
periment subjects received printed instructions, which were read out loud to guarantee that
they all received the same information. At the end of the experiment each subject answered
a debriefing questionnaire. The standard conditions of anonymity and non-deception were
implemented in the experiment.
Subjects were recruited through an online recruitment system. For each treatment, we
conducted 2 sessions; in each session there were three groups with 15 subjects each. So
there were 45 subjects per session. Each session lasted between 90 and 120 minutes, and
on average subjects earned approximately 18 euros.
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3.3 Experimental Findings
Throughout this section, for ease of exposition, we will present average behavior across
groups on a round by round basis in the various plots. However, as the groups are playing
a repeated game across twenty rounds, clearly observations across rounds for a group
are not independent. So we will simply take the average across the last five rounds for
each group as the observation. This means that in the statistical tests we will have six
independent observations (corresponding to the six groups), per treatment.
To get a first impression of the dynamics, Figure 7 depicts behavior observed for one
group in treatment EXO. Similarly, Figure 8 depicts the dynamics for one group in treat-
ment ENDO. In those figures, blue represents the circle players’ preferred action and red
represents the triangle players’ preferred action. For simplicity, unreciprocated proposals
are not shown in both figures. These figures point to a dramatic difference in action choice
in the two treatments. Moreover, the different action choices are driven by very different
patterns of linking. In the exogenous networks setting, we observe conformity on majority
action, while in the endogenous networks setting we observe segregation and diversity.
These figures bring out the dramatic effect of endogenous linking on network architec-
ture and on behavior clearly.
We now turn to a closer examination of the data on behavior in the coordination game,
across the two treatments, ENDO and EXO. In EXO, most subjects choose the majority
action, but in ENDO individuals choose actions more or less in line with their preferences.
In particular, the average number of subjects choosing the majority’s action across rounds
is significantly lower in ENDO than in EXO, 8 < 14.68 (Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney: z=–
4.34, p=0.00). Figure 9 shows that the difference between treatments is due to the choices
by the minority. Indeed, there is practically no change in the behavior of the majority
across these two treatments. The members of the minority, on the other hand, rarely
choose the majority action under ENDO while they eventually converge to all choosing
that action under the treatment EXO (z=-2.99, p=0.003).8 In ENDO there are no players
from the minority choosing majority action, while in EXO it cannot be distinguished from
7 (t=-1.73, p=0.16). To summarize: the majority chooses its preferred action almost from
8We note that 5 out of 6 groups in EXO achieve full conformity, in the 6th group the minority and the
majority choose different behavior. There are no differences in results regarding the tests used, except for
the last case: the number of minority players conforming in EXO is significantly different from 7 in all
rounds if the outlier group is included. Therefore, we omit the group from the analysis and the illustration
in Figure 9.
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Figure 7: Illustration of dynamic behavior in EXO
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Figure 8: Illustration of dynamic behavior in ENDO
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Figure 9: Action choice in ENDO and EXO.
the start under both treatments and persists with it throughout the rounds. The minority
chooses its preferred action under ENDO and distinguishes itself almost fully from the
majority under ENDO, from the start and persists with this choice. On the other hand,
under EXO, around 40% of the minority start by conforming to the majority action and by
round 10, this fraction is well in excess of 80%. Everyone in the minority group is choosing
the majority action by the end of the rounds and gradually this fraction converges to 100%.
We next discuss the data on linking choices in ENDO. At the start, almost 80% of
the links within the groups are formed, but less than 20% of the cross group links are
formed. By round 10, this tendency accentuates and over 90% of the within group links
are in place, but less than 10% of the cross group links are being formed. Eventually,
the network converges to two distinct complete components that have virtually no links
between them. Thus we see the emergence of complete segregation. This is illustrated in
Figure 10. The average degree of the minority is 5.99 and that of the majority is 6.93.9
Our first set of findings leads to:
Result 1. With endogenous linking, subjects converge rapidly to segregation and diversity
9Recall there are 7 (8) players in the minority (majority) so that each of them can link to at most 6 (7)
others sharing the same type.
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Figure 10: Link Choices in ENDO.
of actions. With an exogenous complete network, they converge gradually to conformism
on the majority’s preferred action.
There is a risk in forming links with individuals of the other type: it is not clear if
successful coordination will be achieved and in the event of failure to coordinate, there is a
negative return (equal to the cost of the link). To investigate the role of this risk in shaping
behavior, we next turn to small and zero costs of linking.
3.4 The role of linking costs
We start with a discussion of a treatment with low linking cost, given by k = 0.5. The game
is as in ENDO, but to make the payoffs comparable, we set the value of other parameters
at α = 4.5, β = 2.5. We refer to this low cost treatment as CHEAP.
To get a first impression of the pattern of linking and action choice Figure 11 presents
the dynamics in one group. This figure suggests that lowering the costs of linking leads to
greater linking across preference types, but that it does not significantly effect the long run
outcome, relative to the baseline (High Cost) treatment: we still observe (almost complete)
segregation and diversity.
21
Figure 11: Illustration of dynamic behavior in CHEAP
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Figure 12: Link choices in CHEAP.
We turn next to the analysis of the data from the experiments. First, we discuss
networks formed by subjects under CHEAP and we compare them to networks formed
under ENDO. We observe that subjects in CHEAP very early on form all links within
own group (over 80%) and very few links across groups (less than 20%). The members
of the majority converge to almost full within group connectivity by round 10. Members
of the minority exhibit less connectivity within own group: the fraction of all ties within
the group remans around 90% toward the end of the experiment. But by round 10, across
group links have fallen to less than 10% of possible links. And this persists until the end.
The average degree in the majority’s component is 6.94 (99% of the potential links are
formed) and in the minority’s component the average degree is 5.3 (88.3% of the potential
links are formed). The between-type average degree is 0.62.
Next, we turn to the choice of actions. Figure 13 gives us a first impression of the
dynamics of conformism. Members of the majority converge to their preferred action by
round 5, and persist with this choice until the end of the rounds. The minority too chooses
its preferred action by and large, and this trend emerges very early on and persists. Overall,
less than 10% of the minority members choose the majority’s preferred action eventually.
Finally, we consider a treatment with zero costs of linking. We refer to this treatment
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Figure 13: Action Choice in CHEAP.
as FREE. The values of the parameters are now set at α = 4, β = 2 and k = 0. This
mitigates the risk in linking fully: forming a link is now a ‘weakly dominant’ strategy.
So we expect to see the complete network; this is the same network as in the exogenous
complete network, and so we we conjecture that subjects would choose to conform on the
majority action too, in line with the outcome under EXO.
To get a first impression of the pattern of linking and action choice Figure 14 presents
the dynamics in one group. We notice that individuals are very active in creating links
from early on: the network is close to being complete. Nevertheless, individuals choose
their own preferred action: there is clear convergence to diversity in action. We now discuss
the data from the experiments to get a more detailed picture of connectivity and action
choice.
In the treatment FREE, having no linking costs promotes integration from the start
(see Figure 15). The interaction structure is highly connected from round 1, and the high
rates of connectivity continue over time, without much variation. Out of the 105 links
that can be formed in all, across rounds there were on average 95.6 in FREE while there
were only 49.13 in ENDO (z=-4.18, p=0.00). The majority formed more within-type links
in FREE compared to ENDO (z=-3.31, p=0.0009), and so did the minority (z= -3.31,
24
Figure 14: Illustration of dynamic behavior in FREE
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Figure 15: Link Choices in FREE.
p=0.0009). But the main difference was on across-group ties: this increased from 0.62 links
in ENDO to 6.27 links in FREE (z=-4.8,p=0.00).
We then turn to action choice: we have seen that the network is close to being complete,
so in line with the outcome under treatment EXO we should expect to see conformity
on the majority’s preferred action. Our main finding is that despite similarities in the
interaction network, the behavior remains close to the segregated communities outcome.
In other words, subjects choose distinct actions, even though they have formed links and
are in a network that is close to a complete network. The majority chooses their most
preferred action, as does the minority. Thus, we see integration with diversity.
Figure 16 illustrates the dynamics of action choice under FREE and compares it to
the behavior observed under ENDO. The main observation is that the level of conformity
is indistinguishable between ENDO and FREE (z=1.45, p=0.15). The coordination
dynamics differ slightly: the majority converges faster to full coordination under ENDO
as compared to FREE (z=4.42, p=0.00). But the diversity in behavior is clear cut, in
spite of almost complete integration.
We note that the high level of connectivity in FREE leads to more attempts at co-
ordination across types than in ENDO and CHEAP. The majority players choose the
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Figure 16: Action Choice in FREE vs. ENDO.
action preferred by the minority slightly more often, compared to what they would do un-
der segregation. Similarly, the minority players tend to choose the majority action a little
more often than in ENDO. But, in the aggregate, these attempts fail, and we observe, by
round 15, a clear diversity of actions. To summarize:
Result 2. When costs of linking are low but positive, subjects choose a segregated network
and diversity of actions. When costs of linking are zero, subjects choose an almost fully
integrated network, but persist with diverse action choices.
To highlight the uniformly strong effects of endogenous linking we put together the
behavior across the three linking cost treatments in Figure 17.
So far we have concentrated on the connectivity and the behavioral outcomes. Clearly,
freedom of choice in linking has very strong and striking effects along these two dimensions.
We now turn to the welfare implications. Table 2 provides an overview of the welfare
effects. It shows the level of welfare attained in the laboratory as a percentage of the
welfare attained in the first best outcome – conformism on the majority action.
We see that the overall loss is very large: society loses one-third of the efficient welfare.
Interestingly, this loss is almost entirely borne by the majority, who lose almost one half of
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Figure 17: Action Choice in the endogenous linking treatments
Treatments (Outcomes) All Majority Minority
EXO
Conformity 100% 100% 100%
(Diversity) (67%) (55%) (94%)
ENDO, CHEAP, FREE
Segregation & diversity 67% 55% 94%
(Integration & conformity) (100%) (100%) (100%)
Table 2: Freedom of association: effects on welfare
the attainable welfare (under integration and conformism). By contrast, the minority loses
only 6% of their welfare (in the welfare maximizing outcome) by opting for segregation and
diversity.10
10This difference in loss levels may suggest that inequality aversion is at work. However, observe that
the equilibrium payoffs are exactly the same under exogenous as well as under endogenous networks. As
we observe conformism and social optima in the exogenous setting, we rule out inequality aversion as an
explanation for the segregation and diversity outcome.
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3.5 Effects of minority size
We briefly study the effects of the size of the minority. As the size of the minority falls,
the payoff losses of separating itself rise and we conjecture that this may induce greater
integration and conformism.
To test this hypothesis, we conducted a final experiment in which we considered a
majority of size 12 and a minority of size 3. We refer to this treatment as LOWCON-
FLICT. In this case, segregation remains a pairwise stable outcome, but the payoff losses
for the minority in segregation outcome are very large. The game and parameters are as
in ENDO; we only vary the group composition.
We find that the network is much more densely connected. Out of the 105-possible
links that can be formed, individuals form on average 101.7 links across rounds, which
is significantly greater than the level of connectivity in FREE (z=3.02, p=0.003). The
majority formed significantly more links than the minority across rounds, 13.64 > 13.2
(z=-3.32, p=0.001). As illustrated in Figure 18, it took the minority longer to link within
their own type than it took the majority. But more importantly, there were multiple
unreciprocated proposals from the minority to the majority in the first round. On average,
a member of the minority proposed 10.5 links to the majority in the first five rounds and
only 7.6 links were formed. The majority, on the other hand, proposed 2.0 and formed
1.9 links with the minority in the same block. While the majority players were at first
reluctant to create links with the minority, the minority players persisted with proposals.
This persistence appears to have triggered reciprocity in the following rounds.
We observe that the initial reluctance of the majority to form connections with the
minority breaks down due to both the persistence of link proposals from the minority and
due to the behavior of the minority. More specifically, we observe that from the first round,
78% of the minority players conformed (i.e. chose their least preferred action), and by
round 3 all minority players were conforming completely. The number of majority players
choosing their preferred action is not different from 12 across rounds (t=-1.0, p=0.36) and
the number of minority players conforming is exactly 3 in the last five rounds. Thus we
conclude:
Result 3. Consider the setting with LOWCONFLICT. With endogenous linking, sub-
jects converge rapidly to complete integration and conformity on the majority’s preferred
action.
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Figure 18: Link Choices under LOWCONFLICT
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Figure 19: Action Choice under LOWCONFLICT
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4 Theoretical Explanations
Our experimental findings point to the key role of linking activity by individuals in shap-
ing their behavior. These findings motivate a closer theoretical examination of the process
through which the linking matters. In this section we explore dominant approaches to
understanding coordination problems that rely upon beliefs and dynamics and on intro-
spection, respectively. We view these approaches as offering complementary explanations
in helping us understand the experimental findings.11
4.1 Beliefs and Dynamics
We start with the approach that focuses on the role of small errors in the process of choice,
over time. The idea here is that individuals make small errors or conduct small experiments
and these deviations off the best response help in identifying one of the many (static)
equilibrium outcomes. So we will consider a model of dynamics with small perturbations.12
First consider an exogenous complete network g. In any period t > 1, the dynamic
process is described as follows. In each period, a player i is chosen at random to update his
strategy xti myopically, best responding to what the other players with whom he interacts
did in the previous period, i.e., xt−1−i . There is also a probability 0 <  < 1 that a
player trembles and chooses a strategy that he did not intend to. Thus, with probability
1 −  the strategy chosen is xti = arg maxx′i ui(θi, x′i, x
t−1
−i , g) and with probability  the
strategy is xti 6= arg maxx′i ui(θi, x′i, x
t−1
−i , g). The probabilities of trembles are identical
and independent across players, strategies, and periods. These trembles can be thought
of as mistakes made by players or exogenous factors that influence players’ choices. Once
initial strategies are specified, the above process leads to a well-defined Markov chain where
the state is the vector of actions xt that is played in period t. The Markov chain has a
unique stationary distribution, denoted µ(x). Thus, for any given strategy profile x, µ(x)
11We note that the treatments require a group of 15 subjects to play the same game repeatedly (20 times).
In principle, therefore, we should also be considering repeated game effects. In our setting, equilibria of the
repeated game will include a sequence of the static game equilibrium, and possibly other more complicated
patterns of behavior (that are not equilibrium in the static one short game). In the experiments, subjects
converge fairly quickly and behave very much in line with a static equilibrium. The key finding is the contrast
in outcomes between the exogenous and the endogenous linking setting. As both these treatments involve
repeated interaction, we feel that repeated game effects are not central to understanding this difference.
12Following the original work of Kandori et al. [1993] and Young [1993], the study of stability in coor-
dination games remains an active field of research; for recent work in this field, see Newton and Angus
[2015].
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describes the probability that x will be the state in some period (arbitrarily) far in the
future. Let µ = lim µ
. According to Young [1993], a given state x is stochastically stable
if it is in the support of µ. Thus, a state is stochastically stable if there is a probability
bounded away from zero that the system will be in that state according to the steady
state distribution, for arbitrarily small probabilities of trembles. In the context of our
experiment, Proposition 6 specifies the existence of a unique stochastically stable state in
the EXO treatment.
Proposition 6. Consider an exogenous complete network. If βα >
n+4
3n , then conformity
on the majority’s preferred action is the only stochastically stable outcome.
The proof of this result is given in the Appendix. According to Proposition 6, stochastic
stability provides a clear prediction of convergence to the conformity on the majority’s
preferred action, which is consistent with our observations from the EXO treatment.
Next consider the endogenous network formation game. Let us simplify the dynamic
process by assuming independence of actions in x and linking choices in g such that X = An
(i.e., as if linking choices and actions were selected simultaneously). Furthermore, let gt
denote the network g at the end of period t and st = (gt, xt) denote the action profile at
the end of period t (where xt is as in the exogenous case previously described). In any
arbitrary period t, we assume the following dynamic process: (1) first a pair of players ij
is randomly picked according to a fixed probability distribution pij where pij > 0 for each
i, j ∈ N . Both players then decide whether to adjust their joint strategies sij such that it
is a best response to st−1−ij for both i and j (such adjustment may therefore involve adding
or severing the link gtij and/or changing one or both actions x
t
i and x
t
j). Note that g
t
ij = 1
implies that xti = x
t
j even if x
t−1
i 6= xt−1j . Similarly, gtij = 0 implies that xti 6= xtj even if
xt−1i = x
t−1
j . (2) After those choices are made, with probability 0 <  < 1, each choice
(actions and link) is reversed by a tremble. As a result, there may be up to 3 trembles
within a single period t (both actions and the link). This process determines the state st
according to well-defined probabilities. All trembles and random selections are assumed
to be independent in the dynamic process. This leads us to determine stochastic stability
across our experimental treatments involving an endogenous network formation.
Proposition 7. Consider the endogenous linking model. If k > 0 and k ≥ 2β−α, then all
pairwise stable equilibria are stochastically stable. If k = 0 and βα >
n+4
3n , then integration
with conformity on the majority’s preferred action is the only stochastically stable outcome.
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The proof of this result is given in the Appendix. According to the first part of Propo-
sition 7, stochastic stability under the assumption of the dynamic process described above
remains indecisive and cannot predict any specific outcome whenever k > 0. More im-
portantly, it is invariant to the size of the subgroups (Na and Nb) and the linking cost
k > 0, which have shown to significantly influence behavior in our experiment. Another
noteworthy observation from the proof of the first part of Proposition 7 (in Appendix) is
that the result is mainly driven by the possibility of trembles on the players’ actions (no
tremble on the link itself is necessary to reach the stability result). This therefore suggests
that such a result is robust as it would hold despite assuming a slightly different dynamics
as long as trembles are allowed on the actions.
However, the second part of Proposition 7 states that stochastic stability provides a
clear prediction of convergence to integration with conformity on the majority’s preferred
action when k = 0. This is inconsistent with behavior observed in the FREE treatment.
To summarize: in an exogenous complete network, small perturbations in the dynam-
ics lead to conformism on the majority’s preferred action. This is consistent with the
experimental finding. In the endogenous network model with positive linking cost, small
perturbations sustain both integration and conformism, and a variety of segregation and
diversity outcomes. The theoretical prediction is permissive: the experimental findings on
segregation are weakly consistent with the prediction. However, in the absence of any link-
ing cost, small perturbations lead to integration with conformity on the majority’s action,
which is not consistent with our experimental findings.
4.2 Team Reasoning
Strategic uncertainty is likely to play a major role in explaining people’s behavior in our
endogenous network formation game. In such a scenario, the obvious difficulty to accurately
anticipate every other individual’s behavior appeals for some salient mechanism to be used
as a coordination device. Such mechanisms have been studied in the past as possible ways
to significantly simplify the framing of the strategic situation from the players’ perspective.
For example, there is evidence that strategy labeling in games can be effectively used by
collectively rational players to coordinate Sugden [1995], Isoni et al. [2014]. It is however not
obvious what labeling cue(s) could be exploited in our experiment setting. Alternatively, it
has been argued that situations involving strategic uncertainty can trigger different modes
of reasoning. Indeed, as suggested by Bacharach et al. [2006], some individuals may engage
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in some form of team reasoning, according to which they identify themselves as members
of a group and conceive that group as a unit of agency acting in pursuit of some collective
objective.13 In the context of our experiment, a minority (majority) team reasoner would
conceive the minority (majority) group as a unit of agency, and as a result would frame
the scenario as a two player game between the minority and the majority. In other words,
this theory assumes that every player of the same type shares the same mental model and
consequently acts alike, i.e., for any i, j ∈ N , xi = xj if θi = θj . This leads us to define a
Team Reasoning (TR) equilibrium s∗ as a strategy profile where no individual i ∈ N can
benefit by a joint deviation of all players of the same type as i. Formally, for any i ∈ N ,
Ui(s
∗) = maxsJ Ui(sJ , s
∗
−J) where J = {j ∈ J : θj = θi}, and sJ =
∏
j∈J xj is a joint
strategy of group J .14 This assumption of same-type similarity in behavior considerably
simplifies the decision problem in a fixed complete network, as shown through Proposition
8.
Proposition 8. Suppose an exogenous complete network. If |Na| > |Nb| and |Nb|n < βα <
|Na|
n , then conformity on the majority’s preferred action is the only TR equilibrium.
The proof of this result is given in the Appendix. Our empirical observations from
EXO are consistent with Proposition 8. In particular, the above equilibrium is justified as
follows: it is strictly dominant for the majority to play their preferred action, and knowing
this, the minority is better off conforming to the majority’s preferred action (see the proof
of Proposition 8 for details). This difference in the depth of reasoning required highlights
the difficulty for the minority to reach equilibrium as compared to the majority. Moreover,
the same theory can be applied to the endogenous network formation game, as shown in
Proposition 9.
Proposition 9. If |Na| > |Nb| and |Nb||Na| < min(
α−β
β−k ,
β−k
α−β ), then:
• Integration with conformity on the majority’s preferred action is the only TR equilib-
rium consistent with forward induction.
• Segregation with diversity is a TR equilibrium consistent with backward induction.
13As an example, the collective payoff of a group can be determined as the average individual payoff
among its members.
14This equilibrium concept is an extreme case of the unreliable team interaction equilibrium introduced
by Bacharach [1999] where all players are assumed to be team reasoners with probability 1.
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The proof of this result is given in the Appendix. Let us assume that r = α−ββ−k =
β−k
α−β ,
consistently with all our experimental treatments involving endogenous linking. In such
scenarios, the socially efficient outcome is the unique TR solution of the game, which relies
on some forward induction reasoning: the majority signals its intention to play its preferred
action a by forming links with the minority. However, the salience of such a signal can
affect the emergence of this solution. For example, if |Nb||Na| << r, then the signal is very
salient, and since the marginal benefit of the minority for being linked with the majority
is also large, integration with conformity is likely to emerge. This is consistent with our
observations from LOWCONFLICT. On the other hand, as |Nb||Na| becomes closer to r,
15
the signal from the majority weakens, and the minority becomes more indifferent about
whether to form links with the majority. As a result, convergence to segregation with
diversity is more likely to emerge as it also characterises a (risk-free) sub-game perfect
TR equilibrium. This is consistent with our observations in ENDO and CHEAP. In
the particular case where k = 0 as in FREE, although Proposition 9 still applies, there
exist alternative TR equilibria where linking occurs across different types and everyone
selects their preferred action. In fact, suppose that every minority player forms links with
7 out of the 8 majority players (resulting in a total of 49 links out of 56 possible links
across types). In this case, conforming to the majority’s preferred action would yield
each minority player a payoff of 28, which is also the payoff for selecting their preferred
action. As a result, diversity in such a highly connected network configuration can hold
as a possible TR equilibrium. 16 Our observations in FREE are therefore consistent with
this kind of equilibrium behavior (according to Figure 16, less than 90% of links across
types are formed).
To summarize: the theory of team reasoning sketched above points to two features that
facilitate integration and conformity with endogenous linking: one, a sufficiently strong
signal of the majority’s intention to play their preferred action through linking, and two,
a sufficiently large marginal benefit for the minority to form links and conform.
4.3 Social preferences and bounded reasoning
In this section we briefly discuss two other possible theories: social preferences and level-k
reasoning.
15Note that if |Nb||Na| > r, then the forward induction argument does not hold anymore (see details in the
proof of Proposition 9 in the appendix).
16Note however that this kind of TR equilibrium does not hold whenever k > 0.
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Social preferences have been used to understand behavior in economic settings. Fehr
and Schmidt [1999] and Bolton and Ockenfels [2000], argue that people are sensitive to
inequality in payoffs and often act to reduce such inequality. One could therefore argue
that such inequity aversion can explain results from our experiment. This is motivated by
the observation that conformism creates a large gap in payoffs between the minority and
the majority, whereas payoffs are relatively similar under heterogeneity. We note that this
argument applies equally well for exogenous and for endogenous treatment. But we find
that in the treatment EXO, players choose in favor of conformity, while with the same
payoff considerations, they choose in favor of segregation and diversity in the endogenous
linking treatment. If inequity aversion were a strong driving force of behavior, we would
expect diversity to emerge in both settings, which is not what we observe.
We next explore the role of limited cognitive abilities. Here we consider cognitive
hierarchy theory as introduced by Camerer et al. [2004], according to which players are
assumed to be heterogeneous in terms of their depth of reasoning, or reasoning levels. This
theory says that naive level 0 players choose at random, level 1 players best respond to
expected level 0 players’ choices, level 2 players best respond to expected level 1 players’
choices, and so on. Applying this theory to the exogenous complete network game from
EXO, we obtain the following prediction: as level 0 players will play randomly regardless
of their type, level 1 players will best respond by selecting their preferred action (out of 14
other players, 7 are expected to play their preferred action, which is enough according to
Proposition 1). If the size of the minority is large enough, as in EXO, then any level m
player (with m >1) will best respond to level m−1 players by also selecting their preferred
action. In other words, diversity is the predicted outcome. Note that this prediction is
robust to the type of naive behavior assumed by the level 0 players. In fact, suppose instead
that level 0 players’ default behavior is to select their preferred action. In this case, as
above, any level m player (m >0) will choose their preferred action as a best response
to level m − 1 players. Our experimental findings under EXO are inconsistent with this
prediction.
5 Conclusion
The aim of this paper was to study the relation between two values: freedom of association
and social cohesion.
We start by defining a network formation and action choice game in which individuals
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benefit from selecting the same action as their neighbours. However, one group of individ-
uals prefers to coordinate on one action, while the other group prefers to coordinate on
a second action. There exist multiple equilibria, which come broadly in two forms: one,
integration where the network is fully connected, and every player conforms to the same
action and two, segregation where the network is composed of two groups, with members of
the groups choosing a distinct action. We show that social welfare is (uniquely) maximized
under full integration and conformity on the majority’s action.
Faced with the multiplicity in equilibrium, we conduct laboratory experiments with
human subjects. We observe that individuals with different preferences segregate into
distinct groups with different actions. This diversity of actions is robust with respect to
the costs of linking.
To understand the role of freedom of association, we then examine a setting with an
exogenous network. Again in the theoretical model, there exist a variety of equilibria, dis-
playing conformism and diversity. But, in the experiment we observe that subjects almost
always choose to conform on the action preferred by the majority. We therefore conclude
that there is a tension between two values: social cohesion and freedom of association.
This tension can lead to large welfare losses.
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Appendix A: Proofs
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 6:
Let Nmaj be the majority group whose members prefer action x ∈ {a, b}, i.e., Nmaj =
{i ∈ N : θi = x}, and Nmin = N\Nmaj represents the minority group in N (|Nmin| = 7).
The set of absorbing states is characterised by the set of Nash equilibria in pure strategies
as specified by Proposition 2. Without loss of generality, let Cmaj define the conformity
outcome where everyone selects the majority’s preferred action x (∈ {a, b}), Cmin define
the conformity outcome where everyone selects the minority’s preferred action y 6= x, and
D define the diversity outcome where everyone plays their preferred action. As a result,
there are at most three recurrent communication classes each of which corresponds to a
particular absorbing state: Cmaj , Cmin, and D. We want to determine the resistance
of every path between every two recurrent classes, which corresponds to the number of
trembles necessary to move from one absorbing state to another. For example, r(Cmaj , D)
determines the resistance from state Cmaj to state D. According to Proposition 1, every
player in the complete network selects their preferred action if m other players in N also
select it, such that nβ−αα+β < m ≤ nβ−αα+β + 1. From Cmaj , it therefore takes at least m
players from Nmin to switch their action through trembles before it is a best response
for the remaining players to switch theirs. As a result, we have r(Cmaj , D) = m. A
similar argument leads to r(Cmin, D) = m. From D, it takes at least |Nmin| −m players
from Nmin to tremble before it is a best response for the remaining players from Nmin to
switch theirs. Therefore, we have r(D,Cmaj) = |Nmin| −m. A similar argument leads to
r(D,Cmin) = |Nmaj | −m as it takes |Nmaj | −m players from Nmaj to tremble before it is
a best response for the remaining players from Nmaj to switch theirs.
Finally, it is easy to see that r(Cmaj , Cmin) = r(Cmaj , D) + r(D,Cmin) = |Nmaj | and
r(Cmin, Cmaj) = r(Cmin, D) + r(D,Cmaj) = |Nmin|.
According to Young [1993], given any state x, an x-tree is a directed graph with a
vertex for each state and a unique directed path leading from each state y (6= x) to x.
The resistance of x, noted r(x), is then defined by finding an x-tree that minimizes the
summed resistance over directed edges. From the above, it is easy to show that r(Cmaj) =
r(Cmin, D) + r(D,Cmaj) = |Nmin|, r(Cmin) = r(Cmaj , D) + r(D,Cmin) = |Nmaj |, and
r(D) = r(Cmin, D)+r(Cmaj , D) = 2m. Since |Nmin| < |Nmaj |, we have r(Cmaj) < r(Cmin).
Moreover, βα >
n+4
3n implies that |Nmin| < n2 < 2m, and therefore r(Cmaj) < r(D). It fol-
lows that Cmaj is the only stochastically stable outcome, Young [1993].
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PROOF OF PROPOSITION 7:
Suppose that k > 0. Let us first determine the set of absorbing states. It is easy to see
that any two players who play the same action must be linked with each other. This implies
that the network corresponds to a set of isolated complete components. Moreover, since
|A| = 2, there can be at most 2 such components. We will refer to any complete network
as an integration outcome, and any network with 2 distinct components a segregation
outcome. First, it is straightforward to see that any integration outcome with conformity
on the same action from A is always stable. Regarding the segregation outcomes, it follows
from Proposition 1 that a player in any connected group M chooses his preferred action
if there are at least m other players from M to choose the same action, where m >
β
α+β |M | − α−βα+β . It is then easy to see that whenever M = {i}, the isolated player i must
be playing his preferred action (xti = θi), and this outcome is stable as long as 2β− k ≥ α.
Let us now assume that |M | > 1 and xti 6= θi for some i ∈M . In this case, i can benefit by
deleting a link within M and switching to xti = θi only if |M |β − k < α. Alternatively, i
can benefit by adding a link with a player j 6∈M and switch to xti = xtj = θi if |M | < 2α−kβ .
If |M |β − α < k or |M | < 2α−kβ , the corresponding state is stable only if all players in
M are choosing their preferred actions, i.e., M ⊆ {i ∈ N : xti = θi}. However, whenever
|M |β − α ≥ k and |M | ≥ 2α−kβ , then any possible configuration is stable (players’ types
within each component are irrelevant).
Let us now determine the recurrent communication classes. We denote Cmaj as the
integration state with conformity on the majority’s action, and Cmin as the integration
state with conformity on the minority’s action. Moreover, it is clear from above that
there exist multiple segregation states. However, looking at the resistance between pairs
of segregation states, we observe that, for any segregation state seg1, there exists another
segregation state seg2 such that r(seg1, seg2) = 1. In fact, a single tremble on an action
in seg1 suffices to reach seg2’s basin of attraction. More specifically, take a segregation
absorbing state involving two complete components M1 and M2. In this case, if a tremble
leads a player i ∈M1 to switch action, then all other members from M1−{i} will be better
off deleting their link with i. Moreover, since adding links between i and any member of M2
would be mutually beneficial, links will be formed between i and all members of M2. This
results in a new segregation state involving two complete components M ′1 = M1\{i} and
M ′2 = M2∪{i}. Moreover, a similar argument implies that r(Cmaj , seg1) = r(seg1, Cmaj) =
r(Cmin, seg2) = r(seg2, Cmin) = 1 for some segregation states seg1 and seg2 involving an
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isolated player (M1 = {i} and M2 = N\{i}). Thus, we have that for any absorbing state
s1, there exists another absorbing state s2 such that r(s1, s2) = 1. It follows that, for any
absorbing state x, the corresponding x-tree is a directed graph where the resistance of every
edge is exactly 1. As a result, the resistance of s is r(x) = n− 1. Since all absorbing states
carry the same resistance, it directly implies that all absorbing states are stochastically
stable.
Now suppose that k = 0. Again, integration with conformity on the same action is still
stable, and therefore the corresponding recurrent communication classes Cmaj and Cmin
still hold. It is then easy to show that the only other absorbing state consists in the com-
plete network where every player selects their preferred action. In fact, since k = 0, it is
weakly dominant for everyone to form links with everyone else, in which case such diversity
is a stable outcome. We refer to this recurrent communication class as D. Note that any
stable segregation outcome from above where some players play their least preferred action
belongs to D. The proof of Proposition 6 then directly follows.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 8:
Since players of the same type choose the same action, they each earn the same payoff.
We then refer to the majority and the minority as single entities. Note that the majority
would obtain at least |Na|α for playing a, and at most nβ for playing b. If βα < |Na|n ,
then it is strictly dominant for the majority to play a. Moreover, the minority would then
obtain |Nb|α for selecting b, and nβ for selecting a (assuming the majority plays a). Since
β
α >
|Nb|
n , the minority is then strictly better off selecting a. This yields conformity on the
majority’s action as the only equilibrium solution.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 9:
We again refer to the majority and the minority as single entities. It is straightforward
to see that segregation with diversity is a subgame perfect equilibrium. Regarding the
forward induction solution, the reasoning is as follows. The majority would obtain |Na|(α−
k)+k for not forming links with the minority (and playing a). If the majority instead links
with the minority, then playing b would yield |Na|(β − k) + k− |Nb|k if the minority plays
a, or n(β−k)+k if the minority plays b. Since |Nb||Na| <
α−β
β−k , forming links with the minority
and playing b is strictly dominated by not forming links and playing a. As a result, if the
majority forms links with the minority, it will then play a (forward induction). Similarly,
the minority would obtain |Nb|(α − k) + k if not forming links with the majority (and
43
playing b). However, if the minority links with the majority, then playing a would yield
n(β − k) + k, and playing b would yield |Nb|(α− k) + k − |Na|k (the majority would then
play a as shown above). Since |Nb||Na| <
β
α−β , if the minority forms links with the majority,
it would be strictly better off selecting a. Moreover, since |Nb||Na| <
β−k
α−β , the minority is
strictly better off forming links with the majority and play a. This leads to integration
with conformity on the majority’s preferred action.
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